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Case No. 20080810-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PlaintifFAppellant? 
vs. 
FRANK AUGUST MARRONE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from a final order of dismissal, which followed an order granting 
Defendant's motion to suppress. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-A-4-103(2)(d) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting Defendants motion to suppress the evidence 
as having been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
Standard of Review: Factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly - erroneous standard, 
but the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to 
the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts. See. State v. Mogen, 2002 UT 
App235, 52P.3d 462,464. 
Preservation: Defendant raised the issues below in a motion to suppress which was 
opposed by the State. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For conduct occurring on November 8,2007, Defendant was charges by Information 
with (1) possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, (2) 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and (3) speeding, a class C 
misdemeanor. R.l-3. Following a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound Defendant over 
to stand trial. R. 35-36; R. 93: 1-31. Defendant thereafter moved to suppress evidence seized 
during the traffic stop. R. 39-40,46-54. After taking evidence and considering the parties1 
written and oral arguments, the trial court granted the motion to suppress in a written 
memorandum decision. R. 73-84 (Addendum). The case was thereafter dismissed on the 
State's motion and the State timely appealed. R. 85-89. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 8, 2007, Trooper Michael Bradford was on patrol, conducting drug 
interdiction traffic stops on 1-80 in Summit County in the general Park City area. R. 93: 3,4, 
14, 52. Trooper Bradford was normally stationed in Monticello, but was summoned by his 
supervisor to Summit County along with other troopers to form an interdiction team. The 
primary objective of the exercise was to flood 1-80 with troopers and stop, further 
investigate and search eastbound traffic primarily in an effort to catch persons who might be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
running drugs from the west coast to points east of Utah. R. 93: 2, 35, 36, 45, 46, 52-54. 
Trooper Bradford positioned his cruiser in the median running radar on eastbound traffic. R. 
93: 14-16, 35, 36. Defendant, Frank Marrone, was traveling eastbound, alone, in a Chevrolet 
Trailblazer, with California plates. R. 93: 36, 37, 52, 53. Trooper Bradford determined 
Marrone was speeding and effectuated a stop. R. 93: 38, 57 (R. 74: % 2). When the 
Trooper first approached the driver's side of the stopped vehicle, Marrone stated he was 
sorry for speeding and the Trooper advised him that speeding was in fact the reason for the 
stop. R. 93: 38, 57 (R. 74: \2). Bradford asked that Marrone produce a license, registration 
and rental agreement. R. 93: 58 (R. 74: f2). During the period while Marrone was obtaining 
the requested information, Trooper Bradford observed that the vehicle had what he called a 
"lived-hi" appearance. R. 93: 37, 62 (R. 74: ]f3). There was a camelback water device (a 
backpack with a bladder for holding liquids) over the driver's seat. There was a cooler on 
the rear passenger floor, several food snacks and "Red Bull" energy drinks on the seat. R. 
93: 5, 6, 37, 62 (R. 74: ]f3). Approximately two to three minutes elapsed from the point 
when the officer first made contact until the license, registration and other requested 
paperwork were presented. R. 93: 82-85. The trooper asked little if any questions while 
Marrone searched for and gathered the requested documents. Once the documents were 
produced the trooper examined Marrone about his starting point, where he was headed and 
the purpose of the trip. R. 93: 82-85. Trooper Bradford had no personal recollection on the 
sequence of the questioning while at Marrone's vehicle. R. 93: 58, 77. Marrone testified that 
while the trooper was at the driver's window, the questioning regarding Marrone's travels 
added approximately five minutes to the stop. R. 93: 82-85. 
3 
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At the time the trooper questioned Marrone about his itinerary, the trooper testified 
that he had no reasonable suspicion that Marrone possessed or was trafficking drugs; at best 
he had only a "hunch". R. 93: 62, 63. The facts objectively showed Trooper Bradford had 
no reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. R: 79, f3. The trooper generally asked 
itinerary questions on stops in an effort to determine whether there exists a suspicion of cbug 
trafficking. R. 93: 15, 16, 57-61. The trooper asked everyone questions regarding itinerary 
on most all stops without having any reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. R: 
93: 17, 58-61. He learned to do this through interdiction training. R. 93: 15-16, 60-61. The 
questions are specifically geared to ultimately obtain the opportunity to search the vehicle. 
R. 93: 15. From the answers to the questions at the Trailblazer, Bradford learned that 
Marrone had flown from Florida to California to help his mother with the recent wildfires 
and he was now driving a rental vehicle back to Florida. R. 93: 39 (R. 75: f4). At about this 
time, Bradford requested that Marrone exit his vehicle and accompany the trooper to the 
patrol car. R. 93: 71 (R. 75: |^4). The trooper claimed that he wanted Marrone in the patrol 
car so that he could obtain Marrone's social security number, the state in which he was 
bom, and to continue to question Marrone about his travels. R. 93: 71,77. (R. 75: <|}5, 6). At 
the point that the trooper requested that Marrone accompany him to the patrol car, the 
trooper testified that there was no reasonable suspicion that Marrone possessed or was 
trafficking in drugs. R. 93: 62-63,71. 
Once in the patrol vehicle, it was not thoroughly clear regarding the timing of the 
events and questions posed by the officer. R. 75: |^5 (R. 76: *f7). When Bradford and 
Marrone entered the patrol vehicle, Marrone was in the front seat where he heard everything 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Bradford broadcasted on his police radio and all communication broadcast back to 
Bradford. R. 93: 80. Although the officer was unclear on the timing, one of the first things 
Bradford did in the patrol car was call Sergeant Salas, the K~9 officer, to request his 
presence. R. 93: 71. Bradford testified that he had already concluded there might be a need 
for Salas' dog to search the Marrone vehicle. R. 93: 72. 
During the time when Trooper Bradford was completing Marrone's citation. 
Sergeant Salas and Lieutenant Simmons arrived and remained in their respective vehicles. 
R. 93: 12, 71, 72. Although not clear on the timing, Trooper Bradford had dispatch "run" 
Marrone9s information. R. 93: 78 (R. 75: ^ 5). The trooper was not clear on when he ran a 
warrants check. R. 93: 78,79. 
While in the police vehicle and in response to Bradford's questions, Marrone stated 
that his mother drove him to Reno, Nevada to rent the vehicle. Marrone was driving back to 
Florida but was first stopping in Wyoming to hunt with friends from North Carolina. R. 93: 
63, 64 (R. 7516). Marrone did not know what game he was hunting but knew he was going 
through an outfitter and believed the hunting weapons were to be provided by the outfitter. 
R. 93: 63, 64, 77-79 (R. 75, 7616). Trooper Bradford never testified at what point dispatch 
got back with information on Marrone's documents. Trooper Bradford never testified when 
dispatch responded on a warrants check. Trooper Bradford never testified when he had 
sufficient information to prepare Marrone's citation. Trooper Bradford did testify that the 
entire period while in the patrol car he continued asking Marrone questions on his travels 
even while preparing the citation. R. 93: 79. The fact that Trooper Bradford continually 
asked questions and follow-up of Marrone delayed completion of the citation by as much as 
5 
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fifteen to twenty minutes. R. 93: 83-85 (R. 75:1J5,7). 
Although the precise sequence was not clear, sometime prior to issuing the citation 
and while the trooper was questioning Marrone on travel plans, dispatch radioed Trooper 
Bradford and advised him that Marrone had past arrests for drug offenses. R. 93: 20, 79. (R. 
76: Tf7). After Marrone overheard dispatch advise Bradford of past arrests, he replied by 
volunteering to Bradford that he had nothing to hide and Bradford could search his car or 
run a dog over it if he wanted. R. 93: 79 (R. 76 ^ 7). At this point, the officer did not respond 
to Marrone; rather he completed the citation. After completing the citation, Bradford 
presented it and the other documents to Marrone who was still sitting in the passenger seat. 
R. 93: 73 (R. 76 T|8). Only at this point, after dispatch advised of prior drug offenses, did 
Trooper Bradford claim to form an opinion that there existed a reasonable suspicion that 
Marrone was trafficking in drugs. R. 93: 18, 63. After handing the citation to Marrone, 
Bradford advised Marrone to "drive careful and have a good day". R. 7, 93: 25, 72, 73, 79. 
The trooper said this to Marrone because he had been advised in his training as well as by 
supervisors and prosecutors that he should use language calculated to make it appear that 
the driver was free to leave, when in fact the driver was not free to leave. R. 93: 26, 27. This 
was an effort on behalf of the officer to shift the stop from a category II stop to a category I 
stop so that he can claim to have gained the driver's consent to search the vehicle in a 
category I environment. R. 93: 25-27, 74. The trooper never informed Marrone that he was 
"free to go" because according to Bradford, Marrone was not free to leave. R. 93: 24-25. 
Marrone exited the patrol vehicle and started walking back to his vehicle R. 93: 73. At this 
point the trooper exited the patrol car, walked up to Marrone and confronted him between 
6 
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the vehicles. R. 93: 7-8, 74. The trooper asked Marrone if he could ask him additional 
questions to which he replied 66yeah, g0 ahead". R. 93: 8-9, 75. The trooper asked whether 
Marrone was involved in any illegal narcotics trafficking and Marrone9 s response was "no, 
you can look, bring a dog". R. 93: 8-9, 75. Without consent, the trooper would not have 
personally searched the entire vehicle but he would have had the dog search it. R. 93: 75. 
Sergeant Salas, the canine officer who had eventually arrived as per Bradford's request 
assisted Bradford in the search of the Marrone vehicle by running his dog around the car. R. 
93:42, 80 (R. 76,77: f|8). There is no mention in the record that the dog detected any drugs. 
R. 93: 42 (R. 77: ^ [9). However Trooper Bradford ran sound tests on spare tires which were 
located in the rear of the rental vehicle which revealed that there was something stashed 
inside the tires. R. 93: 43 (R. 77: ^ 9). Upon removing the tires from their rims, forty pounds 
of marijuana were discovered. R. 93:42,43 (R. 77: ]f9). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court concluded from a totality of the circumstances that during the 
initial period of Trooper Bradford's questioning of Mr. Marrone at the roadside, the Trooper 
lacked objective reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity to justify the extended 
detention of the driver. The Trial Court concluded from the evidence that the trooper's 
detention and questioning unreasonably and measurably extended the duration of the stop 
which resulted in an unlawful detention. The trial court further found that when Trooper 
Bradford continued to question Marrone in his patrol vehicle, it again was without 
reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity and resulted in unreasonably and 
measurably extending the length of the stop and compounding the unlawful detention. 
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While in the UHP patrol car and when he exited the vehicle, Marrone was aware the 
trooper knew of his prior drug offenses, prompting his declaration that he had nothing to 
hide and his consent to search. Within a matter of a few seconds of Marrone5 s exit Trooper 
Bradford confronted Marrone and continued questioning him in an effort to obtain 
Marronefs consent to search the vehicle. One additional patrol vehicle and a canine unit 
were now at the scene pursuant to Bradford's earlier request. The District Court correctly 
concluded from a totality of the circumstances that Marrone's consent to search was 
obtained as a result of the illegal detention and questioning, that the consent resulted from 
exploitation of the prior police illegality and that the evidence should be suppressed to deter 
such police conduct. The findings of the District Court and the decision to suppress the 
evidence should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TROOPER'S EXTENSIVE QUESTIONING 
OF THE DRIVER RESULTED IN AN UNREASONABLE 
AND MEASURABLE EXTENSION OF THE TRAFFIC STOP 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the "right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." U.S. Const. Amend IV. Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants 
constitutes a seizure. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 
2d 660 (1979). The Constitution only forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). In determining whether a search is lawful, the Court must first 
consider whether there was a constitutional seizure. An unreasonable traffic stop is an 
unconstitutional seizure. See. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 28,63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
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In determining whether a traffic stop was reasonable, the Court must ask two basic 
questions: (1) was the police officer's action justified at its inception; and (2) was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first place? Harnen at 29, citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 
(Utah, 1994). 
Mr. Marrone did not challenge the justification of the stop during the suppression 
motion and this is not an issue on appeal. Rather the basis of this appeal is that the State 
takes issue with the District Court's determination that the trooper unreasonably and 
measurably extended the length of the stop by extensively questioning Marrone without a 
reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. 
After effectuating the stop, Trooper Bradford approached the Marrone vehicle to 
make contact with the driver. After a short discussion about the speeding, the trooper 
requested and Marrone produced a license, registration and other documentation. 
Approximately two to three minutes elapsed from the officer's initial contact with Marrone 
until the requested documents were presented. R. 93: 82-85. Few questions were asked of 
Marrone while he was gathering the requested documents. R. 93: 82-85. Once the 
documents were produced, the trooper examined Marrone regarding his starting point, his 
destination and the purpose of the trip. R. 93: 82-85. This questioning was more than casual, 
was calculated to lead to a vehicle search and added measurable time to the stop. R. 76: 6, 7. 
Marrone's unchallenged testimony was that it added approximately five minutes to the stop. 
R. 93: 82-85. From the questions posed, the trooper learned that Marrone had traveled to 
California to help his mother combat the wild fires and save her home. The information 
9 
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gleaned from questioning at the Marrone vehicle was innocuous and unremarkable. Most of 
the information the trooper learned which ultimately formed the basis for his reasonable 
suspicion of drug trafficking was not at the Marrone vehicle but later in the patrol car. R. 93: 
77,79. 
During the time Trooper Bradford stood outside the Marrone vehicle, he observed 
the vehicle's interior as he had been trained. The trooper observed that the interior of the 
vehicle had what he called a "lived in" look. There was a camelback water pack, a cooler on 
the rear passenger floor, food snacks and energy drinks in the vehicle. R. 74, TJ3. In its 
appeal, the State argues that these observations along with the vehicle being a rental and a 
claim of observing incense sticks (which were not taken into evidence and the existence of 
which were disputed by Marrone, R.93: 62, 85) formed a reasonable suspicion of drug 
trafficking justifying an extension of the stop. Brief p. 13-15. 
However, as concluded by the District Court, all facts and observations when 
collectively viewed fall short of a reasonable suspicion and further detention was not legally 
justified. Most of the trooper's observations are consistent with persons traveling cross-
country with few stops and did not constitute a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. 
Although the State claimed that the officer's observations amounted to a reasonable 
suspicion, the District Court ruled that it could not agree that the observations legally 
qualified as reasonable suspicion. R. 79: p . 
On appeal, the State agrees that a mere "hunch" of criminal activity is insufficient to 
satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. When the trooper was examined at the evidentiary 
hearing, he admitted that after all observations and discussions at the Marrone vehicle, he 
10 
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had no reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking; he had only a "hunch". R. 17, 93: 62-63. 
This was a factor in the trial Court's conclusion that the trooper's observations did not 
objectively and under the totality of circumstances, amount to a reasonable suspicion. R. 79, 
80. The trooper was not questioning Marrone to confirm or dispel a reasonable suspicion. 
Rather he was questioning Marrone primarily to determine whether there existed a 
reasonable suspicion. R. 93: 58-61,15-16; R. 82: A[9. Without a reasonable suspicion further 
detention to pose questions unrelated to the initial stop was improper. 
The State argues that this Court should adopt a blanket rule that reasonable suspicion 
is not necessary for law enforcement to question a driver about his/her itinerary. Citing 
cases such as U.S. v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006), the State recommends that this 
Court should adopt a similar holding. 
Utah case law is clear and long standing that during a vehicle stop, if there is 
investigative questioning that detains the driver beyond the initial stop, it must be supported 
by a reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity State v. Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 
(Ut. App. 2000); State v. Lafond, 68 P.3d 1043 (Ut. App. 2003); State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 
650 (Ut. 2002). During a stop, law enforcement may request a driver's license, registration, 
conduct a computer check and issue a citation. Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after fulfilling the purpose of the initial stop constitutes an illegal 
seizure unless the officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. 
State v. Despain, 1A P.3d 1176, 1179 (Ut. App. 2003). Also, See. State v. Mogen, supra. 
The detention need not occur after issuance of a citation; it can occur prior to issuing the 
citation. See. State v. Chism, 107 P.3d 706 (Ut. App. 2005) (If a warrants check 
11 
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significantly extends the driver's period of detention, the detention is illegal) 107 P.3d 710 
14-
To rule that all questions on travel itinerary are permissible on every traffic stop 
regardless of whether there exists a reasonable suspicion would carve-out an impermissible 
exception to the existing doctrine of Utah case law. Trooper Bradford was well aware that 
these itinerary questions were unrelated to the reason for the initial stop and are asked to 
gain reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking and obtain consent or probable cause to search 
the stopped vehicle. R: 93: 15-16, 56-61. To conclude differently would be a fiction. The 
Court should decline to adopt the broad rule requested by the State regardless of whether 
federal case law allows the exception. This Court has denied similar requests by the State 
where the request was based upon the fact that the Tenth Circuit condoned the conduct. In 
State v. Despain, 74 P.3d 1176 (Ut. App. 2003) the State urged this Court to adopt a rule 
that would make an officer's inquiry into the presence of weapons reasonable per se 
regardless of whether the question was supported by other reasonable suspicion. In Despain, 
the State cited U.S. v. Holt, 264, F.3d 1215 (10th Or. 2001) for concluding that an officer's 
questioning of a motorist concerning the presence of a loaded weapon did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and was permissible during the normal 
course of any traffic stop. This Court declined to adopt such a rule because it would be 
contrary to existing Supreme Court doctrine under State v. Hansen, supra, which 
highlighted the limited and prescribed behavior allowed by police officers during the 
temporary detention of a citizen. See, Despain, FN2. Similarly, this Court should decliine to 
adopt the position that itinerary questions are blanketly permissible on any traffic stop 
12 
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regardless of whether or not there exists a reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. 
In the present matter, the trial court ruled that under State v. Baker, if a detention for 
reasons other than the traffic stop occurs, it must be temporary, necessary and must be based 
upon a reasonable suspicion. The Court quoted Baker for the proposition that "investigative 
acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the 
stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do 
not represent any further intrusion on the [detainee's] rights". State v. Baker, 2008 Ut. App. 
115,182 P.3d 935, cert, granted, 99 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008). 
Regardless of whether Marrone can or cannot be legally questioned on itinerary 
without a reasonable suspicion, the facts of this case show that both the amount of 
questioning and delay of time was lengthy and unreasonable and resulted in an illegal 
detention. 
The District Court found that the trooper's questioning at the Marrone vehicle 
necessarily extended the stop. R. 78, 79. Mr. Marrone testified that the delay measured 
approximately five minutes and was unchallenged by the State. Further, while the trooper 
had Mr. Marrone in his patrol car and continued to examine Mr. Marrone in depth about his 
travel plans, Marrone testified that the extensive questioning postponed the writing of the 
citation by a significant time, as much as fifteen minutes. The delay due to the trooper's 
examination of Marrone was measurable, significant and amounted to more than a 
minimum time contemplated by the federal courts in allowing an inquiry into the driver's 
itinerary. This was not the "brief inquiry" contemplated by U.S. v. Arvizu cited by the State. 
U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002). The lengthy detention and questioning was not a 
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diligent pursuit of investigation likely to confirm or dispel suspicions quickly. See, State v. 
Chevre, 994 P.2d 1278 (Ut. App. 2000). Bradford was conducting an extensive cross-
examination. 
The District Court reasoned that the best way to create a minimal, non-intrusional 
delay in further questioning without a reasonable suspicion was to ask any questions 
unrelated to the original cause for the stop during the performance of other necessary 
functions of the stop. The Court ruled that while at the Marrone vehicle, if the conversation 
about travel plans occurred during Man-onefs gathering of the documents and it added no 
additional time to the detention, the questioning would have been permissible. R. 79. The 
Court also ruled that if the further conversation about travel plans in the patrol car took 
place during the computer check and the writing of the citation adding no further detention, 
this again would have been permissible. R. 80. However the District Court found that the 
trooper's travel questions occurred outside and in significant addition to the time for 
gathering documents, checking the computer and writing the citation. R. 78-81. 
While in the patrol car, the trooper continually asked Marrone questions with many 
follow-ups. The more questions Marrone would answer, the more questions the trooper 
would pose. R. 93: 64. The trooper learned that Marrone helped his mother protect her 
home from the wildfires at the Marrone vehicle. R. 93: 77. The questions and answers 
regarding Marrone's mother driving him to Reno to rent a vehicle and the hunting trip in 
Wyoming with the people meeting him from North Carolina took place in the patrol car. 
R.93: 77-79. These questions were asked without the trooper having a reasonable suspicion 
that Marrone was trafficking in drugs. R. 93: 18, 63. The State failed to show that this 
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interrogation was conducted while the trooper was performing other necessary functions of 
the stop. R. 80^4. 
The evidence showed and the District Court found that the examination by Trooper 
Bradford in the patrol vehicle was unreasonable under all circumstances and measurably 
extended the length of the stop which resulted in an unlawful detention. R. 82 ^ [8, R. 80 |4 , 
R. 93: 83-84. The information acquired through the unlawful detention was the same 
information which the trooper claimed eventually formed his reasonable suspicion that 
Marrone was trafficking in illegal drugs. R. 93: 6-7, 18, 61-64 (R. 81:1f6, R. 80: j[4). The 
original unlawful detention started at the Marrone vehicle when asking Marrone extensive 
travel questions and the detention was significantly, measurably and illegally extended 
again with the examination of Marrone in the patrol vehicle. R. 80: ^4. Any reasonable 
suspicion of further criminal activity eventually concluded by Trooper Bradford was a direct 
result of questioning during and as a result of the illegal detention. 
MARRONE'S CONSENT TO SEARCH 
WAS AN EXPLOITATION OF THE PRIOR 
ILLEGALITY, NOT VALID AND THEREFORE 
THE EVIDENCE MUST BE SUPPRESSED 
If Marrone did not consent to the search and/or if the consent was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the officer's prior illegality, the evidence seized is inadmissible. State v. 
Hansen, infra. A consent is valid only if "(1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the 
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, p. 16147. 
Here, the District Court found the consent to be voluntary. R: 81 [^5. Voluntariness is a 
legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. Hansen, p. 17 f51. The appropriate 
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standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, with the proof 
being preponderance of the evidence. Hansen, p. 17 ^ 56. Marrone asserts that the consent 
was not voluntary for the reasons that 1) the officer attempted to deceive Marrone into 
believing he was free to go when in reality, he was not; 2) the officer confronted Marrone 
with a request to search within a few seconds of leaving the patrol car and shortly after 
dispatch informed the officer of Marrone's past drug offenses in front of Marrone; 3) the 
arrival of the K-9 unit and another officer right before Marrone's exit from the patrol car, 
implying Marrone could not refuse to consent or a search was inevitable and 4) the officer 
never informed Marrone of his ability to refuse consent or break-off questioning. However, 
if this Court determines that Marrone's will did not appear to have been overborne, or that 
his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired and rules the consent was 
valid, the evidence was tainted and should remain suppressed under the second prong of the 
test, in that the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
The second prong of the voluntariness test for determining valid consent involves an 
exploitation analysis. Hansen, p. 18161. Whether a person's consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of a prior illegality is ultimately a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. 
Hansen, p. 18 *[|61. The purpose behind excluding evidence obtained by police exploitation 
is 'to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effective available way - by 
removing the incentive to disregard if. Hansen, p. 19 ^62. 
In making an exploitation analysis, there are three relevant factors to review: 1) The 
purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct; 2) the presence of intervening circumstances, 
and 3) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent. Hansen, p. 19 [^64. 
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In the Motion to Suppress the District Court found that the consent given by Marrone 
was obtained as a direct result of the conduct of Trooper Bradford in obtaining information 
improperly and the evidence resulting from the search must be suppressed. R. 81,1J6-7. In 
reviewing the first of the exploitation factors the District Court found that the purpose of the 
illegal conduct was to obtain the very consent acquired, and that it was flagrant. Trooper 
Bradford asked everyone these questions about itinerary regardless of whether he had a 
reasonable suspicion. The trooper stated that he asked these questions of Marrone with the 
purpose of obtaining a reasonable suspicion so that he could ultimately achieve consent 
from Marrone to search his vehicle. R. 93: 15. After all, this was an interdiction exercise. 
As the Hansen Court found, seeking consent under these circumstances showed that the 
purpose of the illegal detention was to exploit the opportunity to ask for consent and such 
events show there was a direct connection between the officer's misconduct and the driver's 
consent. Hansen, p. 19 ]f66. As the Hansen Court concluded, 'The incentive present in this 
case...is precisely the type of incentive that must be removed...", and since there was a 
direct connection between the purpose of the misconduct and the consent, suppressing the 
evidence derived from this misconduct should have a deterrent effect. Hansen, p. 19 [^67. 
In reviewing the next exploitation factor, the Court is to consider whether there 
existed any intervening factors between the officer's misconduct and Man-one's consent that 
may have mitigated the illegality. Intervening circumstances may include such events as an 
officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent or consult with an attorney. 
Hansen, p. 19 ]f51. In this case there are few and insufficient intervening circumstances. 
Marrone was not told he could refuse consent or consult an attorney. He was never told he 
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was free to leave, because he was not. The arrival of the K-9 unit and the other patrol 
vehicle just prior to Marrone exiting Bradford's patrol car lead a reasonable person to 
believe the action was escalating, not breaking-off. Marrone believed a search to be 
imminent and inevitable. 
The State claims Marrone voluntarily gave consent twice. However, this was not an 
unsolicited consent. Bradford summoned the K-9 unit. Two units arrived. The trooper asked 
if Marrone was trafficking drugs. Dispatch had informed the trooper that Marrone had prior 
drug offenses which all prompted and almost called for a response and denial that he was 
carrying drugs at this time. R. 76 ^ [7. His consent to search was the result of a constructive 
and actual accusation. 
The last exploitation factor to consider is the temporal proximity between the illegal 
detention and consent. "A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and 
consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time 
to dissipate. Hansen, p. 19 ]f69. Here there is little if any time between the illegal detention 
and questioning and the consent to search. The District Court found there to be little if any 
time between the exit from the patrol car and the consent. R.76: ^||8, R. 81: |^6, R. 83: \ 9. The 
State agrees that there was little time between the exit from the patrol vehicle to the consent. 
Appeal Brief, p. 20. 
Based upon Trooper Bradford's purpose behind the misconduct, the lack of 
intervening circumstances and the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct; and 
Marrone's consent, the consent appears to have resulted from exploitation of the prior police 
illegality. Since the police detention and questioning were specifically calculated to obtain a 
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reasonable suspicion and consent search for ostensibly, among other things, the interdiction 
exercise success, the deterrent effect of suppressing evidence appears quite appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's decision in granting Marrone's 
Motion to Suppress should be affirmed. 
DATED this !5_day of May, 2009. 
D'ELIA&LEHMER 
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